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Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for 
Revenue Gains  
 
Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper argues that global corporate tax policies have long been dominated by a political 
consensus among governments of countries at all levels of economic development, to the 
effect that forces of tax competition render taxation of the cross-border income of 
multinational companies both infeasible and unwise. Current tax laws around the world, 
which permit widespread tax avoidance through shifting corporate profits to tax havens, 
reflect the implementation of this political consensus. The global political consensus against 
effective corporate tax rules seems likely to survive the current efforts of the OECD, in its 
studies of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), to devise legislation that would revitalise 
corporate income tax. Countries around the world, therefore, are unlikely to implement more 
than symbolic and minimally incremental BEPS reforms. 
 
This paper warns that the current high level of attention being paid to BEPS in the media and 
by international organisations might lead developing country governments to expect 
unrealistic returns from efforts to implement BEPS-related reforms. The paper therefore 
advises governments of developing countries to be selective in allocating resources to 
implementation of BEPS reforms, generally focusing only on those reforms that will clearly 
generate increased revenue in light of the very limited administrative resources typically 
available to developing country revenue agencies. In general, developing countries will be 
well advised to devote the bulk of their enforcement resources to the development of fiscal 
instruments that do not encounter the political obstacles facing taxation of cross-border 
corporate income. These include excise and general consumption taxation, income taxation 
of large and medium-sized domestic businesses, natural resource royalties (as opposed to 
income-based taxes on mineral producers), real property taxation and payroll taxation. 
 
Keywords: developing country taxation; base erosion and profit shifting; transfer pricing. 
 
Michael C. Durst is a long-time US tax practitioner, an author on international taxation and 
developing countries, a former government official and law professor, and an ICTD 
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Introduction 
 
Developing countries often are said to have greater need for revenue from corporate income 
tax than the wealthier countries of the world. Because of widespread ‘informality’ in their 
economies, including heavy reliance on cash as a medium of payment, developing countries 
face serious limitations on their ability to raise revenue from domestic sources, including 
personal income and consumption taxes. In addition, the economies of developing countries 
often depend heavily on income from inbound investment in a wide variety of industries. For 
these reasons, those working in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and other forums to recommend legislative and administrative reforms 
to curtail base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) often express hope that their work will be of 
particular benefit to the world’s developing economies.1 
 
The OECD’s BEPS project is now approaching its conclusion. The OECD has already 
released an impressive series of discussion drafts that indicate the direction the final BEPS 
recommendations are likely to take, and the OECD’s likely recommendations already have 
been debated among lawmakers and other tax policymakers around the world. The BEPS 
materials released to date by the OECD are insightful and well-crafted, and despite virtually 
certain political opposition it seems likely that countries around the world will adopt at least 
some elements of the OECD’s envisioned program. 
 
But it is also clear that the legislative and regulatory reforms that result from the BEPS 
recommendations will result at best in only the partial curtailment of profit shifting. The strong 
political and economic forces – forces of tax competition – that brought about the erosion of 
the world’s corporate tax base over time remain highly influential, and they may be stronger 
than ever. Moreover, even apart from the problem of tax competition, the basic structure of 
corporate income tax makes it peculiarly vulnerable to revenue erosion even through 
relatively small amounts of profit shifting. 
 
The combination of the continued political pressures of tax competition, and the inherent 
structural vulnerability of corporate income tax, make it very unlikely that the current BEPS 
reform efforts will result in a corporate income tax that can meet developing countries’ needs 
for public revenue. There is, further, a danger for developing countries that the BEPS project 
will generate unrealistically heightened expectations for enhancement of revenue yields from 
corporate tax. By relying too heavily on expectations of corporate tax reform, countries might 
give insufficient attention to other fiscal instruments that may offer more realistic promise of 
generating additional revenue. 
 
This article argues that while developing countries should remain closely engaged with the 
BEPS reform efforts of the OECD and other international organisations, developing countries 
should also direct substantial portions of their tax reform efforts toward development of 
important revenue sources other than corporate income tax. In particular, this article: 
 
(i) describes the political forces that over the years have resulted in the widespread 
impairment of corporate income tax, in countries at all levels of economic development, 
through base erosion and profit shifting; 
(ii) illustrates an unavoidable structural anomaly of corporate income tax in the 
international setting that renders it inherently resistant to effective reform; 
(iii) suggests that while developing countries generally should seek to improve their 
corporate income tax laws in response to the recommendations that are likely to arise 
from the BEPS process, countries should also devote serious attention to further 
                                                 
1  The OECD’s ongoing BEPS efforts are documented at <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps.htm>. For discussions of the 
potential significance of the BEPS project for developing countries, see IMF (2014) and OECD (2014). 
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development of alternative revenue sources, which may well offer greater prospects for 
substantial revenue gains, even if BEPS reforms can be successfully implemented. 
 
 
1  The political forces of tax competition 
 
The OECD’s efforts to curtail base erosion and profit shifting began when non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and investigative journalists working for mainstream media outlets 
around the world, explained the phenomenon of profit shifting by multinational business 
groups in language that could be understood by members of the general public.2 The 
revelations by NGOs and the media led to forceful demands by political leaders in some 
countries to remedy the erosion of corporate tax bases. These political demands led in turn 
to the initiation of the current BEPS efforts in the OECD. 
 
The reports of widespread profit shifting that led to the OECD’s BEPS effort may have been 
surprising to the general public, but they could not have been surprising to the executives of 
multinational companies, to international tax lawyers and accountants, and to those 
politicians around the world who have been actively engaged in the writing of tax laws. The 
legal mechanisms that support the practice of profit shifting have been present for many 
decades. Lawyers for multinational companies devised them and put them in place in the 
days immediately following World War II, largely in response to the rapid growth of global 
trade in high-margin products that arose from the invention of the post-War ‘wonder drugs’.3 
Large-scale profit shifting quickly became universal within the pharmaceutical industry, and 
the practice grew further with the expansion of multinational enterprise that has accompanied 
the global technological revolution that began in the 1980s. 
 
The idea that lawyers succeeded in embedding in corporate tax laws around the world was 
the notion that companies within the same multinational group could, by making contracts 
with one another, dictate to tax authorities where the group’s income should be treated as 
being earned. At first companies applied this approach to contracts that assigned ownership 
in patents and other intangible rights to subsidiaries established by the groups in low- or 
zero-tax countries. Over time, as acceptance of the use of intragroup contracts to shift 
income grew, taxpayers expanded their use of related-party contracts to shift profits for tax 
purposes, using them, for example, to establish on paper loans from low- and zero-tax 
subsidiaries to operating companies within the group, thereby justifying large payments of 
deductible interest from countries in which group members conduct their business activities; 
and also using contracts to assign specified business risks to low- or zero-tax subsidiaries, 
thereby justifying payments of numerous kinds in return for the risk-bearing that ostensibly is 
taking place.4 
 
From the standpoint of normal legal principles, the idea that tax consequences might be 
determined by contracts between identically-owned corporations is on its face implausible. 
Indeed, in other areas of the tax law, no-one would seriously entertain the notion that 
contracts between parties with non-adverse economic interests would be given weight in 
determining tax consequences. Instead, logic would hold that instead of contracts between 
parties with identical economic interests, the observable facts of the dealings among related 
companies – particularly, what the different companies actually do, and where they do it – 
would govern the apportionment of income among the companies for tax purposes. 
                                                 
2  See, for example, ActionAid (2012); Christian Aid (2009); Drucker (2011); Duhigg and Kocieniewski (2012) . 
3  Useful historical discussions can be found in Avi-Yonah (1997); Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007); Durst and Culbertson 
(2003); Langbein (1986); Wells and Lowell (2012). 
4  Comprehensive discussions of base erosion and profit shifting, in their contemporary forms, can be found in Kleingard 
(2011a, 2011b) and US Congress (2010).  
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Consider, for example, the common occurrence in domestic business taxation, in which a 
seller sells to a buyer property consisting of both depreciable and non-depreciable assets. 
The seller in this circumstance often does not care how the purchase price should be 
apportioned between the depreciable and non-depreciable assets, whereas the buyer, 
seeking the highest level of future depreciation deductions, may prefer that as large a portion 
as possible of the depreciable assets be attributed to the depreciable property. The parties 
might ‘agree’ by contract to an apportionment that assigns a large portion of the total value to 
the depreciable property, but the law would not bind the revenue agency to the parties’ 
agreement. Instead, the law will require the buyer to present facts establishing the value of 
the depreciable property, without regard to the self-serving valuation that might have been 
stated in a collusive contract. The law sensibly requires that the actual facts, not how the 
parties might characterise the facts in a self-serving legal agreement, governs the tax 
consequences of a transaction. But tax laws around the world – ‘transfer pricing’ laws, which 
govern the apportionment of income among members of commonly controlled corporate 
groups – have consistently given substantial deference to the apportionment of income that 
the parents of multinational groups cause their subsidiaries to write into contracts between 
themselves. 
 
Transfer pricing laws typically allow tax authorities some latitude to challenge the bona fides 
of these contracts if the relationships between companies specified in the contracts depart 
manifestly from the parties’ actual dealings. But the test for overriding contracts generally is 
highly subjective, and tax authorities’ theoretical ability to challenge the bona fides of 
taxpayer contracts has not in practice resulted in meaningful constraints on profit shifting. 
The result has been the tremendous expansion of profit shifting that has given rise to today’s 
BEPS process. 
 
This history raises the question of why governments around the world, which suffer large 
losses of national revenue from profit shifting through the use of related-party contracts, have 
tolerated the practice for many decades. The reason lies in the fact that despite 
governments’ tendency to retain corporate taxes on their books, and to give verbal support to 
reform studies like that now being conducted by the OECD, all the parties that are most 
politically influential in tax policymaking – multinational corporations themselves, and 
governments of both developing and wealthy countries around the world – perceive benefit in 
defeating the operation of corporate tax as it applies to income from cross-border 
operations.5 
 
The interest in tax avoidance of multinational corporations themselves is not hard to 
understand – their shareholders would prefer as a matter of course to pay as little tax as 
possible. For governmental policymakers around the world, the interest in hobbling corporate 
income tax in the international setting arises from the influence of two different kinds of tax 
competition. Governmental actors in the wealthier capital-exporting countries of the world, 
which tend to be home to the world’s multinational businesses, face strong political pressure 
to protect the competitive positions of their home-based multinationals. This has translated to 
a reluctance on the part of many wealthy countries to take measures that would constrain 
their multinationals from shifting profits from the countries in which they operate around the 
world.6 In the world’s developing countries, tax policymakers face competitive pressure of a 
different kind: policymakers have tended to be averse to any legal measures that might be 
seen as discouraging inbound investment. As a result, developing country governments as 
well as governments of wealthier countries have tended to resist legal reforms that might 
prevent profit shifting. 
 
                                                 
5  For an influential and early analysis of this phenomenon, see Avi-Yonah (2000). 
6  This reluctance has taken the form, in part, of the willingness of governments to permit their controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules, which are designed to discourage multinationals from shifting income from countries in which 
they conduct business, to weaken. For discussion of this topic, see, e.g., Durst (2014a). 
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In short, for many years there has been agreement among multinational companies and 
policymakers around the world to allow corporate tax to atrophy, as it applies to income from 
cross-border operations, through contractually-based profit shifting.7 Of course, the 
agreement is rarely made explicit. Corporate income tax has substantial ideological appeal in 
many quarters, particularly among some who perceive the tax as ensuring that multinational 
companies are making adequate contributions to public welfare around the world. In addition, 
some perceive corporate income tax as playing a role in mitigating inequalities of wealth 
around the world. There is no point in needlessly confronting the political constituencies that 
hold these views. And, by and large, there has been no need for those supporting current 
practices of profit shifting to defend their positions explicitly. The inherent complexity of 
corporate tax laws has, as a general matter, sufficed to shield the flowering of tax avoidance 
through the use of intragroup contracts from significant public scrutiny. 
 
The media and NGO reports that gave rise to the BEPS inquiry seem have succeeded, at 
least temporarily, in piercing the veil of complexity that has for decades shielded the 
international corporate tax system from public scrutiny. But the recent public exposure has 
done nothing to diminish the imperatives of tax competition that have for decades induced 
governments around the world to permit profit shifting on a very large scale. 
 
Possibly, public interest in international corporate tax reform will persist with an intensity that 
can override the political tendency toward tax competition, and produce reforms that will 
substantially curtail base erosion and profit shifting. Historical experience, however, suggests 
that developing countries should not rely heavily on a result of that kind. It seems likely 
instead that popular political interest in international corporate taxation will fade over time in 
favour of other emergent public issues, if public interest has not begun to fade already. 
Moreover, there are already ample signs that the political forces of tax competition will 
succeed in weakening proposed BEPS reforms, in part through including in the BEPS reports 
stern-sounding and verbally complex changes to international transfer pricing guidelines that 
purport to constrain income-shifting through contracts, but in fact give governments few if any 
workable new standards by which to address the problem. More will be said below about the 
emerging results of the BEPS process. First, however, it may be useful to describe an 
intrinsic, structural limitation on corporate income taxation that would impair the revenue-
raising capacity of the tax in the international setting, even if there were more political will to 
implement the tax effectively. 
 
 
2  The vulnerability that is built into corporate 
income tax 
 
2.1 In general 
 
It is universally recognised that the application of corporate income tax to multinational 
businesses depends heavily on the tax administration’s ability to enforce the fair market 
valuation (arm’s-length pricing) of goods and services that are sold between related parties. 
Consider, for example, a member of a multinational group that purchases brand name 
beverages from its related foreign supplier, and resells them to unrelated buyers in a 
particular country. For income tax purposes, the tax administration has the task of ensuring 
the distributor does not pay its related supplier more than fair market value for the beverages 
it imports, as that would squeeze the distributor’s taxable margin and will lead to partial 
                                                 
7  A prominent UK tax practitioner has observed, ‘I don't think that over the last 20 years or so, one can say that 
governments have driven corporate tax policy; it's the large companies that have driven large corporate tax policy’ 
(Qassim 2015). 
  
 10 
avoidance of local income tax. Similarly, the tax administration needs to ensure that the 
distributor doesn’t inflate its expenses and thus reduce its taxable income by, for example, 
paying trademark royalties to its supplier at higher than a fair-market rate. The need to 
prevent misvaluations of this kind, in transactions between members of multinational groups 
in every industry around the world, is well-known to taxpayers, tax practitioners and tax 
authorities. 
 
What is not always understood, however, is that: (i) even small misvaluations in product 
prices can lead to very large understatements of a taxpayer’s tax liability; and (ii) corporate 
income tax is much more vulnerable to avoidance through misvaluations than alternative 
kinds of taxes that governments might use to raise revenue from multinational businesses 
operating in their countries, including excise taxes and ad valorem royalties on extracted 
natural resources. 
 
Consider first the situation of, say, a beverage importer like that described above.8 Assume 
that in a given year the importer sells products to unrelated parties in its country of operation 
worth $100 million. Assume as well that the proper fair market value, at wholesale, of the 
product that the importer has purchased from its related supplier is $80 million, and that the 
importer has incurred operating expenses that are properly valued at $10 million. The 
importer’s proper taxable income is therefore $100 million minus $80 million minus $10 
million, or $10 million. Assume further that the country in which the importer operates 
imposes a corporate income tax at a rate of 30 per cent. The importer’s proper tax liability 
therefore is $3 million. Assume now, however, that the importer overstates the value of the 
beverages that it imports by 10 per cent – a deviation that will be difficult at best for tax 
authorities to detect. The importer will then report a taxable income not of $10 million but of 
only $2 million, and its income tax liability will be reduced from the proper amount of $3 
million to only $600,000. A 10 per cent misvaluation of the imported product therefore has 
given rise to an 80 per cent shortfall in tax revenue.  
 
Consider now the significance of the misvaluation if, instead of trying to impose a tax on the 
importer’s income, the government imposes a 3 per cent excise tax on the sale of beverages 
of the kind the importer sells. Given the importer’s sales during the year of $100 million, the 
excise tax should raise $3 million in revenue – the same as would be raised by the corporate 
tax considered above if it could be administered successfully. Now, the excise tax will not be 
entirely immune from avoidance: by, for example, misrepresenting sales records, the 
importer, or perhaps resellers who purchase from the importer, might succeed in 
understating their sales volume by, say, 10 per cent. The result would be that revenue from 
the excise tax also would be reduced by 10 per cent, from $3 million to $2.7 million. This loss 
would be regrettable – but far less serious as a fiscal matter than the 80 per cent decline in 
tax revenues brought about by a 10 per cent misevaluation of imported product under 
corporate income tax. Under the excise tax, a 10 per cent misevaluation of product sold 
reduces the revenue yield from the tax by only 10 per cent. The excise tax is far less 
vulnerable to avoidance by misevaluation than an equivalent corporate income tax. 
 
2.2 Extractive industries  
 
Natural resources are central to the economies of many developing countries, so it is 
important to recognise how the special vulnerability of income taxation to valuation 
misstatements is expressed in the taxation of extractive industries. Consider, for example, a 
mining company that extracts ore within a country under a government concession 
agreement. In a particular year, the company extracts and sells ore with a true fair market 
value of $100 million. The company incurs bona fide expenses of $90 million, so that its 
properly measured taxable income is $10 million; and an income tax of 30 per cent on the 
                                                 
8  A similar example can be found in Durst (2014b). 
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mining company should yield the government revenue of $3 million. If, however, the 
company understates its sales revenue by 5 per cent, the company will report revenue of $95 
million minus $90 million, or only $5 million. The government’s tax revenue will fall from $3 
million to $1.5 million. A 5 per cent understatement of value by the taxpayer will have 
reduced the government’s revenue by 50 per cent. 
 
Now consider the situation in which instead of subjecting the mining company to an income 
tax, the government imposes a 3 per cent royalty on the value of extracted product. 
Theoretically, based on the true valuation of the company’s product at $100 million, this 
royalty would yield the government $3 million, the same amount that would be raised under 
the income tax if it could be successfully applied. Under the royalty the company will, just as 
under an income tax, have incentive to undervalue its product. If in response to this incentive 
the company undervalues its product by 5 per cent, the government’s revenue in that 
situation will go down – but it will go down only by 5 per cent, from $3 million to $2.85 million 
– much less than the 50 per cent loss of revenue occasioned by the same misevaluation 
under the income tax. 
 
In practice, the possibility that mining companies will undervalue their product for tax 
purposes is very large. It is common for natural resource companies operating in developing 
countries to sell their raw product, like ore, not directly to third parties but instead to related 
purchasing companies established in low- or zero-tax countries. The companies therefore 
have not only the tax motivation, but ample opportunity, to sell their product at lower than fair 
market value. And given the difficulty of determining the value of mineral products, which can 
depend heavily on the quality of a particular mineral deposit and the distance of the mine or 
well from available markets, significant undervaluations are virtually certain to occur. The 
consequences of these undervaluations are much more serious under income-based taxes 
than under royalties and similar ad valorem levies. 
 
 
3  The likely outcome of the BEPS project 
 
3.1 Current political posture of BEPS efforts 
 
In light of the very high sensitivity of corporate income tax to even small amounts of profit 
shifting through transfer mispricing, only two kinds of legal reform would appear to be 
sufficiently fundamental to curtail it to a fiscally substantial extent. First, countries could 
revise transfer pricing rules so as to disregard the claimed effects of contracts made between 
members of commonly controlled groups, and instead look to the actual geographic locations 
of the group members’ business activities – for example, where their employees are 
stationed and where their customers are located – in determining how income should be 
apportioned between group members. Alternatively, the major capital exporting countries of 
the world could agree to adopt effective systems of CFC rules9 and thereby remove from 
multinational groups the financial incentive for income shifting. 
 
It is already clear, however, even with the BEPS process not yet complete, that neither of 
these comprehensive remedies for profit shifting is within the realm of political acceptability to 
any OECD country. Instead, it seems likely that reforms will be limited to incremental 
changes to laws and administrative practices that may pose some worthwhile benefits to 
governments in protecting their revenues, but will continue to leave open opportunities for 
profit shifting to multinationals on a large scale. 
                                                 
9  See note 6 above. 
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3.2 Likelihood of transfer pricing reforms 
 
In the area of transfer pricing, key participants in the BEPS process have from the start ruled 
out eliminating reliance on contracts in apportioning group income, in favour of the observed 
geographic distribution of a group’s income-producing activities.10 That course of action, 
which would have resulted in what might fairly be described as a ‘formulary’ approach to 
apportionment, has long been politically anathema. Opponents of the approach argue that it 
would raise serious and unsolvable technical problems; others (including this author) have 
believed that the technical problems have been exaggerated, and that the true source of 
opposition to the formulary approach has been not technical concerns but instead political 
aversion arising from pressures of tax competition.11 Whichever view on this question might 
be correct, however, as a practical matter there is no possibility that the BEPS process will 
result in the adoption of transfer pricing rules that disregard the effects of related-party 
contracts and look only to evidence of where a company’s physical activities take place. 
Instead, changes to transfer pricing rules arising from BEPS are likely to consist of: (i) verbal 
adjustments to the standards under which tax authorities will be permitted to disregard 
contractual terms that seem manifestly inconsistent with taxpayers’ actual business 
practices; and (ii) changes to the volume and nature of the information (contemporaneous 
documentation, in the language of transfer pricing practice) that taxpayers are required to 
make available to tax authorities to assist the authorities in transfer pricing examinations. 
 
The adjusted standards for overriding contracts seem certain to remain highly subjective, as 
any attempts to quantify the standards will run foul of the widespread aversion to the use of 
formulas. It is possible that adjustments to subjective standards, if skillfully designed, will 
result in some meaningful increase in the practical reach of tax enforcement – but copious 
experience to date has shown that tax authorities face inherent difficulty in convincing courts 
or other fact-finders of the validity of subjective findings. Tax laws, of all laws, seem suited to 
bright-line rules rather than subjective verbal standards; and the probability is high that the 
practical effects, if any, of modified verbiage in transfer pricing guidelines will be incremental 
rather than transformative. 
 
Similarly, the recommendations for enhanced documentation requirements that arise from 
BEPS may lead to some advances in enforceability, but any effects will be relatively limited. 
One particular innovation, a requirement that taxpayers provide examiners with country-by-
country breakdowns of both their tax liabilities and the locations of their physical activities, 
may have significant effects, as the reporting may help focus examiners’ enforcement efforts 
on those companies that appear to be shifting the highest volumes of profits. Overall, 
however, requirements that taxpayers give tax authorities enhanced access to information 
about companies’ activities are likely to offer relatively small practical benefits to 
enforcement. 
 
A key underlying problem of today’s transfer pricing laws is that they compel tax authorities 
to marshal and assess unrealistically large and complex volumes of factual material. The 
practical problem in enforcement is not too little documentation, but too much. In practice, 
therefore, the expansion of documentation requirements envisioned by the BEPS process is 
unlikely to reduce materially the amount of income that multinational groups can successfully 
shift under arm’s-length transfer pricing rules. 
 
                                                 
10  For discussion of this topic, see, e.g., Bell (2015). 
11  The author has offered a comparative analysis of current transfer pricing rules with a possible formulary approach in 
Bloomberg BNA Tax Management Portfolio 6938, ‘A Formulary System for Dividing Income Among Tax Jurisdictions’. 
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3.3 Likelihood of effective CFC reforms 
 
The OECD has, since the beginning of the BEPS process, given substantial attention to the 
possibility of a substantially strengthened network of CFC rules among the world’s capital-
exporting countries (OECD 2015). A network of CFC rules can be politically feasible, 
however, only if it is to be enacted and enforced multilaterally by countries that, in the 
aggregate, are home to all or almost all of the world’s large multinationals. If coverage is 
incomplete, multinationals based in non-enacting countries will continue to derive tax 
advantages from shifting profits from countries in which they operate, giving those 
multinationals a competitive advantage in the global marketplace. Enacting countries will 
then face strong pressure to relax or eliminate their own CFC rules, and the world will end up 
essentially where it is now – with only spotty coverage of CFC rules around the world, and 
with the rules of some major economic powers, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, essentially ineffective in deterring their multinationals from engaging in profit 
shifting.12 
 
Recently, in response to the BEPS effort, the US Treasury has proposed a version of CFC 
rules that, if enacted by countries globally, could indeed lead to elimination or substantial 
curtailment of profit shifting13 – but politically the proposal has garnered little if any support 
within the United States, and there is no realistic chance of its enactment within the 
foreseeable future. Other countries around the world, including notably the United Kingdom, 
have shown no inclination to devote energy or political capital to building a global network of 
CFC rules that could be effective in addressing profit shifting. 
 
 
4  Post-BEPS directions in developing country 
tax policy 
  
4.1 Overall policy priorities 
 
In sum, although reforms generated by BEPS may offer countries some prospect of 
improved revenue yields from corporate income tax, the BEPS reforms are likely to leave 
opportunities for multinationals to continue to avoid large volumes of taxes through profit 
shifting. In view of this likely prospect, developing country governments would be prudent to 
look for sources in addition to corporate income tax when searching for substantial 
enhancements in revenue collection. 
 
An important caution is in order: despite the limited nature of the improvements that can be 
expected from the BEPS process, the revenue enhancements from even incremental BEPS 
reforms could be of significant value. Developing countries should remain engaged in the 
BEPS process and should carefully evaluate the extent to which the reforms proposed by the 
OECD could improve the performance of their corporate tax regimes. Developing countries 
should, however, be selective in devoting their political and administrative resources to 
BEPS-based reforms, and they also should preserve some of those resources for the further 
development of revenue sources other than corporate income tax. 
 
With respect to BEPS reforms, for example, it appears now that the BEPS process may 
generate recommendations for some relatively simple limitations on the deduction of related-
                                                 
12  See the discussion in Durst (2014a).  
13  23 Transfer Pricing Report 1238, 5 February 2015. 
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party interest expense. The recommendations will not erect a comprehensive barrier against 
profit shifting through interest expense, and revenue recovery from the new limitations may 
be modest for many countries.14 Nevertheless, the administrative costs of applying the new 
limitations probably will be relatively low, and it may well turn out to be sensible for 
developing country governments to implement them. Similarly, the BEPS process is likely to 
expand upon the OECD’s previous recommendation that countries consider adopting 
transfer-pricing safe harbours for evaluating whether local manufacturing and distribution 
affiliates of multinational groups are earning sufficient net operating margins.15 The 
application of transfer pricing safe harbours is likely to provide only limited revenue gains to 
tax authorities, but the safe harbours should save enforcement costs, and even the limited 
revenue gains that might be achieved could well be worthwhile. 
 
Developing country governments, however, should probably avoid committing substantial 
resources toward attempting to implement some other recommendations that are likely to 
arise from the BEPS process. For example, although developing countries should take 
advantage of new country-by-country reporting rules, and should participate in new avenues 
for information exchange among countries, developing countries should otherwise be wary of 
increasing the amount of information that taxpayers must compile in annual transfer pricing 
documentation. The primary effect of increased documentation requirements could well be to 
overloading examiners with peripheral information that will add little to the effectiveness of 
enforcement efforts. Similarly, although developing countries probably should adopt 
whatever verbal formulation arises from the BEPS process to articulate when tax authorities 
should be permitted to disregard the terms of intragroup contracts, developing countries 
probably should limit their spending on training and enforcement activities based on the new 
language. The language likely to arise from the BEPS process regarding related-party 
contracts probably will be too imprecise and subjective to be applied with much practical 
result even by the best resourced and most experienced of tax administrations.  
 
Overall, therefore, the revenue enhancements made available by BEPS, while potentially 
significant, will remain limited, and developing country governments will need to look beyond 
corporate income tax if countries are realistically to increase their revenue from the activities 
of multinational companies doing business within their boundaries. This will be especially 
important with respect to those industries: (i) that tend to be especially important to the 
economies of developing countries; and (ii) that appear to have succeeded to the greatest 
extent in avoiding income tax liabilities through profit shifting. 
 
For many developing countries, natural resource extraction will be among the highest priority 
industries to address. For all developing countries, the list of highest priority industries 
probably should include telecommunications services (including mobile telephone services), 
the distribution of high-margin consumer products (like branded beverages and foods), and 
banking and other financial services (including insurance). 
 
4.2 Natural resource taxation 
 
In many countries, natural resource producers are subject to a combination of taxes, typically 
including a royalty of some kind based on the gross value of raw product that is extracted, 
and some kind of income-based levy on the producer’s net profits. The tax on net profits 
might consist of the regular corporate income tax that is applicable generally in the country, 
or it may consist of a specialised income-based levy like a resource rent tax.16 Economic 
theory has led many to recommend that countries weight their natural resource levels 
                                                 
14  For the author’s views on this topic, see Durst (2015). 
15  See Mitchell (2013). 
16  Useful background discussions of natural resource taxation, from an economic perspective, include IMF (2012); ICMM 
(2009); Sunley et al. (2002). 
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towards reliance on net income based levies, and away from measurements like royalties 
that are based on the gross value of extracted products. The reasoning is that income taxes, 
which unlike royalties and similar levies apply if the producer is successful on a net basis, 
help mitigate the producer’s economic risks. This reasoning is sound in theory, but in practice 
net income based taxes on natural resource producers are so vulnerable to misvaluation of 
both product value and intercompany charges, for interest and other expenses, as to be 
impossible to administer with a reasonable degree of success.17 
 
It is common practice among resource producers operating in developing countries to sell 
their raw product, like ore or raw petroleum, in the first instance to related purchasing 
companies operating in zero- or low-tax jurisdictions. This provides the producers with 
opportunities for tax avoidance by under-valuing the raw product that is sold. The 
undervaluation may be modest – maybe undervaluing the product by only a few percentage 
points – but as illustrated in the examples above, even a small undervaluation of product can 
deprive the government of the producing country of very substantial amounts of revenue. 
Natural resource extractors, moreover, can avoid income tax liabilities through other kinds of 
profit shifting, notably the use of loans and intercompany service agreements involving 
related parties in low- or zero-tax countries. Although the BEPS effort may generate tax 
reforms that improve the performance of income-based taxes as applied to the extractive 
sector (particularly limitations on interest deductions), it is unrealistic to expect the reforms to 
increase the yield from income-based taxes enough to provide governments with adequate 
compensation for the removal of their natural resources. In addition to pursuing BEPS 
reforms, developing countries should devote serious attention to expanding the use of fiscal 
instruments that do not depend on the measurement of net income but are based, instead, 
like royalties, on the value of product that is extracted. 
 
There will be some adverse trade-offs involved in increasing reliance on royalties or other 
levies that are based on the gross value of product extracted. Economists are correct in their 
analysis that levies based on net income potentially do a better job of mitigating investor risks 
and therefore in encouraging investment. But the problem is that despite the theoretical 
advantages of taxes based on net income, they are so vulnerable administratively that 
continued heavy reliance on them can only lead to continued revenue shortfalls. It is true that 
royalties and similar methods are, like income-based taxes, vulnerable to some extent to the 
undervaluation of product – but as demonstrated above, the extent of the vulnerability is 
much less for royalties and similar levies than it is for income-based taxes. Moreover, 
royalties and other levies based on the value of extracted product have no vulnerability to 
profit shifting by excessive interest payments or payments to affiliates for intragroup services. 
Administratively, therefore, royalties and similar gross income levies are intrinsically much 
more robust than taxes based on net income. 
 
Research is called for that moves beyond theoretical considerations and focuses empirically 
on the relative effectiveness of income-based taxes and gross income levies in actual 
practice. This research should employ data from actual cases and should compare the actual 
yields from particular levies with the amounts that the levies were originally estimated to 
generate. The literature is currently, to this author’s knowledge, devoid of analyses other 
than broad anecdotal observations of the practical administrability of different kinds of natural 
resources levies. Critical research, based on hard data, is needed on this important question. 
 
In addition, developing country governments, and the economists around the world who 
advise them, should give enhanced attention to the design of fiscal instruments that are 
based on gross product value but also incorporate some risk-mitigating features for 
investors, such as the graduation of royalty rates based on changes in product pricing and in 
                                                 
17  Not only taxes based on net income, but other arrangements that require the measurement of net income from a natural 
resource property, like production sharing arrangements, also can be vulnerable to misvaluation. 
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the volume of production from a property. Relatively refined kinds of levies on gross product 
value are not unknown around the world today, but they should be given increased attention 
in economic research.  
 
In sum, weighting natural resource levies toward taxes based on net income, while attractive 
in theory, is quite possibly quixotic in practice. The mix of fiscal instruments between levies 
based on net income and on the value of extracted product may well have shifted too far in 
the direction of income-based taxes. Reducing relative reliance on income-based taxes, 
despite the trade-offs involved in the sharing of investment risks, might assist governments 
materially in gaining more adequate compensation for the extraction of their natural 
resources.18   
 
4.3 Other industries 
 
In many developing countries, telecommunications companies (including mobile telephone 
and Internet providers), distributors of high-margin consumer products like branded foods 
and beverages, and banks and other financial institutions tend to have three traits in 
common. First, their services are central to the economies in which they conduct business. 
Second, the companies in these industries very often are local affiliates of foreign-owned 
multinational groups. And third, these companies tend to have very large opportunities to 
avoid corporate income taxation by shifting income to zero- and low-tax affiliates. 
 
In particular, telecommunications companies are often heavily leveraged with related-party 
debt, facilitating income shifting through the payment of interest; and telecommunications 
companies typically have large networks of hard-to-value payments to and from affiliates, for 
such items as call origination and completion, roaming charges, and for technical services. 
Distributors of high-margin consumer products typically have substantial opportunity for profit 
shifting through royalties or other kinds of payments for the use of a group’s trademarks, as 
well as through related-party borrowing. Banks and other financial companies, including 
insurance companies, typically have very large intragroup borrowings (and, in the case of 
insurance companies, reinsurance arrangements) that effectively render transfer pricing 
enforcement impossible even for the most experienced revenue administration. 
 
With respect to all these industries, and perhaps others with similar characteristics, hard-
nosed research is called for to evaluate the extent to which actual revenue recoveries from 
corporate income tax have or have not conformed to expectations. Further, although 
governments should take advantage of anti-avoidance measures that arise from the BEPS 
process, including especially limitations on interest deductions, governments should be wary 
of placing excessive reliance on the prospect of substantially improved revenue recovery 
from these reforms. Revenue losses from profit shifting might be reduced somewhat as a 
result of BEPS reforms, but given the inexorable arithmetic of transfer pricing, under which 
even small misvaluations of related-party charges can lead to large revenue losses, 
corporate income tax is bound to remain disappointing as a source of revenues for 
developing countries. Again, this does not mean that developing countries should dispense 
with corporate income tax – but they should assign greater emphasis to alternative forms of 
taxations if they are to achieve greater revenue from these economically important but hard-
to-tax businesses. 
 
To some extent increases in excise taxes, on products and services that tend to be supplied 
by multinational enterprises, might compensate for revenue that is now lost to corporate 
income tax avoidance. Excise taxes on telecommunications services, banking and insurance 
services, and some high-margin consumer products (notably alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco) are in use throughout the world, in countries at all levels of economic development. 
                                                 
18  See Clausing and Durst (forthcoming). 
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By and large the administrative mechanisms for these taxes are already in place in 
developing countries. Greater reliance on excise taxes, therefore, generally would not require 
the forging of new ground in tax administration; the expansion would take the form of 
increasing rates and perhaps the coverage of existing taxes, rather than introducing new 
ones. 
 
Of course, excise taxes have drawbacks, economically and politically. Both corporate income 
tax as imposed on the producers of goods and services, and excise taxes imposed on the 
purchase of goods and services, impose burdens on both consumers (in the form of higher 
after-tax prices) and producers (in the form of reduced demand for services and therefore 
lower after-tax profits). But in the case of excise taxes the mix of burdens probably falls, in 
most cases, more heavily on consumers, so excise taxes probably are more regressive in 
their incidence than corporate income tax. Further, regardless of the extent to which excise 
taxes are in fact regressive, they are highly visible to consumers and therefore undoubtedly 
are seen, domestically, as imposing greater consumer burdens than corporate income tax. In 
actuality, the regressive effects of excise taxes might be limited, especially if they are 
imposed on products other than basic necessities. Nevertheless, even excise taxes targeted 
at what might be seen as luxury goods and services will have some regressive effects, and 
the visibility of the tax is certain to fuel in political opposition. Moreover, because excise taxes 
impose burdens on multinational companies, through reductions in product demand, as well 
as on consumers, multinational companies can be expected to oppose increased excise 
taxes using arguments based on tax competition, just as companies have done with respect 
to corporate income taxation. Excise taxes therefore are far from an ideal tax, from either an 
economic or political perspective. 
 
 No tax, however, is ideal. All taxes impose burdens on some, all distort economic activity to 
some extent, all have built-in administrative limitations, and all face predictable sources of 
political opposition. And while excise taxes certainly can be regressive, the chronic inability of 
developing country governments to raise adequate revenue also imposes hardships on 
people with low incomes. Historically, I believe that developing countries have tended in their 
policy evaluations to under-appreciate the special vulnerability of income-based taxation to 
tax avoidance through misstated transfer prices of both income and expenses. The mix of 
fiscal instruments today may therefore be tipped excessively toward corporate income taxes, 
and insufficiently toward excise and similar taxes. Policymakers in developing countries, and 
the economists and others who advise them, should give renewed attention in research both 
to the intrinsic limitations of income-based taxation, and to the possibility of placing greater 
reliance on excise taxation for key industries. 
 
Other areas of potential substantial revenue gain would not seek to reach the same base as 
corporate income tax, but nevertheless should be given serious attention by developing 
country policymakers. These include real property taxes and payroll taxes, the 
administrability of which probably is being continually enhanced by advances in the 
automation of property records and personnel compensation systems. 
 
In addition, many developing countries should probably devote greater efforts to surmounting 
the perceived barriers to domestic revenue-raising that have led the perception that 
developing countries have no choice other than to rely on corporate income tax more heavily 
than other countries. Although it is true that the economies of many developing countries 
contain large sectors that are informal, in that they rely primarily on cash or barter payments 
rather than more easily traceable credit card payments or electronic fund transfers, not all the 
participants in countries’ informal sectors are low-income individuals operating businesses at 
very low volume. Every developing country probably has businesses that are large and 
profitable, but nevertheless escape large amounts of tax through the prevalent use of cash 
payments. Intensive, targeted examinations of these businesses, perhaps employing 
technical assistance from countries with well-developed capacity for examining mid-sized 
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businesses, might generate significant revenue sources while conveying a message to the 
public that tax laws are being enforced equitably. Developing countries, with the help of 
technical assistance that is available, should devote efforts to estimating the potential 
revenue yield from targeted examinations of large cash-based taxpayers, and should 
implement intensive examinations of those taxpayers with the largest apparent revenue 
potential. The inherent limitations of corporate income taxation in today’s international 
context, which BEPS limitations are capable of addressing only to a limited extent, lend 
urgency to the need for developing countries to generate additional revenue from higher-
income domestic taxpayers. 
  
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Given the imperfections that are to be found in all tax instruments, it is neither realistic nor 
wise for a country’s policymakers to seek to design a theoretically perfect tax system. The 
best that can be achieved is a mix of tax instruments in which the desirable and undesirable 
qualities of each offset one another to some extent, so that the resulting system is capable of 
raising the revenue needed by a society with as little economic inefficiency and as little 
burden on poorer individuals as can reasonably be achieved. Trade-offs, and the use of 
overlapping fiscal instruments, are unavoidable in some situations.  
 
It has been perceived for many years that corporate income tax should play an especially 
prominent role in the mix of fiscal instruments employed by developing countries. In recent 
years, however, it has been widely recognised that multinational groups, which comprise a 
large portion of corporate income tax base of developing countries, are systematically 
avoiding income taxation in all countries around the world through business structures built 
around base erosion and profit shifting. Moreover, an examination of the structure of income 
taxation reveals that magnified opportunities for avoidance are intrinsic to corporate income 
tax, and that even after the reforms that may arise from the OECD’s BEPS process, large 
opportunities for tax avoidance by profit shifting are likely to remain. 
 
It is important that developing countries do not permit the great attention that the international 
tax community has devoted to BEPS to raise unrealistic expectations concerning 
improvements that might be made to corporate income tax. Instead, the tax research and 
policy agendas should give very serious attention to alternative fiscal instruments, which may 
not encounter as insurmountable political barriers as those that appear to stand in the way of 
effective corporate income tax reform in the international setting. 
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